Abstract-In this paper, based on Scott's PIN scheme and Hu's private key distribution scheme, we proposed a new effective remote registration and log-in scheme for mobile networks and devices. In our article, we can guarantee the performance of the protocol for mobile networks and ensure the security of the private keys saved in mobile devices. Finally, we analyses our scheme and compare with Scott's and Hu's schemes through the experiment on ARM chips.
With the tremendous development of the network technologies, recently ID based authentication and key agreement schemes using elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) have been broadly deployed in the wireless networks for mobile devices. As compared with traditional cryptosystem, ECC offers equivalent security with smaller key size. In 2009, Yang-Chang [4] proposed an efficient and practical ID based two-party mutual authentication scheme employing ECC. They both consider ID-based and ECC properties simultaneously. However, both Yoon-Yoo [5] and Islam-Biswas [6] discovered that Yang-Chang's two-party scheme had some security flaws such as suffered from impersonation, replay attacks and did not provide the session key forward secrecy. To resolve these problems, Yoon-Yoo and Islam-Biswas respectively proposed their effective enhancements with higher security. In 2014, Farash-Attari [7] also presented an effective enhancement over Chou's scheme [8] with more security. Recently Lu [9] point out that FarashAttari's scheme vulnerable to trace attack and do have the problem of clock synchronization and improves FarashAttari's scheme.
Scott [10] proposed an authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote log-in scheme with two-factor. Such a scheme is clearly open to the following active insider attack. In 2010, Hu [11] published a Registration and private key distribution protocol based on Identity based encryption to transfer private key to new user.
In this paper, based on Scott and Hu's works, we propose an effective remote registration and authentication scheme for mobile networks.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives brief information about the underlying definitions and the schemes of Hu and Scott. We present our proposed scheme and its analysis in Section 3 and Section 4. Section 5 is a brief conclusion.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will briefly review some definitions and Scott's and Hu's works. 
A. Bilinear Maps

B. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem
Most of the Pairing based Cryptography applications rely on the hardness of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem for their security:
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. This problem depends on the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem.
C. Scott's PIN Scheme
In Scott's scheme, the algorithm reconstructs the individual secret from the large number stored on the hardware token and the PIN . It is important that a correct individual secret cannot be detected from its format--it is just a number, and any number is possible. FIGURE II. HU'S SCHEME III. REMOTE REGISTRATION AND LOG-IN SCHEME As Scott's algorithm, we ensure safety of the user's privet key saving on the mobile device with the PIN . In our scheme, there are three parts: scheme Initialization, remote registration and remote log-in.
A. Scheme Initialization
The server end need initialize some parameters for the system. First, the server will be in possession of a master secret s , a random element of q F . And the server keep the master secret itself. Then a user's private key could be computed as the form ( ) sH ID , where ID is the user identity and ( ) H  is a hash function which maps to a point on 1 G .
Here we assume that the hash function is modelled as a random oracle 
B. Remote Registration Algrithm
In this part, a user as a new customer could communicate with the server to get the token TOK which the user's private key is hiding by PIN . So, the user can store the TOK in mobile device without fear of private key leakage.
For new user to register with the server, they must prove the ID and some temporary parameters. In return the user is supplied with private key, a point on the curve. Then the user store on the mobile device TOK sA I   , where I is the personal choice of PIN as Fig 3. IV. SCHEME ANALYSIS In this section, we will give a brief analysis of our scheme.
1) The user picks a random number
A. Security Analysis
Our scheme is based on BDH problem. If an adversary can broke the scheme just with the public transport information，he can dill with the BDH problem.
In mobile networks a user may run the scheme on mobile device, and if the user lost his device, he doesn't need to worry about the private key. Because there is no private key in the device, but the token number.
B. Efficiency Analysis
We will compare the performance and functionality of our scheme with other related schemes. To estimate accurately for the running time, we use the MIRACL library to perform the cryptographic primitives for thousand executions and take the arithmetic mean based on 120MHz ARM chip. 
